Proceedings:
No. 5: AAAI-22 Technical Tracks 5
Volume
Issue:
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 36
Track:
AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms
Downloads:
Abstract:
We consider a variant of the standard Bayesian mechanism, where players evaluate their outcomes and constraints in an ex-ante manner. Such a model captures a major form of modern online advertising where an advertiser is concerned with her/his expected utility over a time period and her/his type may change over time. We are interested in the incentive compatibility (IC) problem of such Bayesian mechanism. Under very mild conditions on the mechanism environments, we give a full characterization of IC via the taxation principle and show, perhaps surprisingly, that such IC mechanisms are fully characterized by the so-called auto-bidding mechanisms, which are pervasively fielded in the online advertising industry.
DOI:
10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20450
AAAI
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 36