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Home > Proceedings / Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 35 > No. 18: AAAI-21 Student Papers and Demonstrations

Fair Stable Matchings Under Correlated Preferences (Student Abstract)

Authors

Angelina Brilliantova

Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY, USA


Hadi Hosseini

The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA


Proceedings:

No. 18: AAAI-21 Student Papers and Demonstrations

Volume

Issue:

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 35

Track:

AAAI Student Abstract and Poster Program

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Abstract:

Stable matching models are widely used in market design, school admission, and donor organ exchange. The classic Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm guarantees a stable matching that is optimal for one side (say men) and pessimal for the other (say women). A sex-equal stable matching aims at providing a fair solution to this problem. We demonstrate that under a class of correlated preferences, the DA algorithm either returns a sex-equal solution or has a very low sex-equality cost.

DOI:

10.1609/aaai.v35i18.17878


AAAI

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 35