Published:
2018-02-08
Proceedings:
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 32
Volume
Issue:
Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2018
Track:
AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms
Downloads:
Abstract:
It is well-known that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is not truthful for all agents. Previous studies in this category concentrate on manipulations using incomplete preference lists by a single woman and by the set of all women. Little is known about manipulations by a subset of women. In this paper, we consider manipulations by any subset of women with arbitrary preferences. We show that a strong Nash equilibrium of the induced manipulation game always exists among the manipulators and the equilibrium outcome is unique and Pareto-dominant. In addition, the set of matchings achievable by manipulations has a lattice structure. We also examine the super-strong Nash equilibrium in the end.
DOI:
10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11454
AAAI
Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2018
ISSN 2374-3468 (Online) ISSN 2159-5399 (Print)
Published by AAAI Press, Palo Alto, California USA Copyright © 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence All Rights Reserved.