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What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain

Authors

Edith Elkind

University of Oxford


Piotr Faliszewski

AGH Univesity of Science and Technology


Jean-Francois Laslier

Paris School of Economics


Piotr Skowron

University of Oxford


Arkadii Slinko

University of Auckland


Nimrod Talmon

Weizmann Institute of Science


Proceedings:

No. 1: Thirty-First AAAI Conference On Artificial Intelligence

Volume

Issue:

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 31

Track:

AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms

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Abstract:

We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules Ñ SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, ChamberlinÐCourant, and PAV Ñ for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.

DOI:

10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10612


AAAI

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 31