Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit, non-wastefulness, and individual rationality for the multi-unit unit-demand auction, except for some naïve ones. In this paper, we first propose a mechanism that satisfies all the above properties. We then make a comprehensive comparison with two naïve mechanisms, showing that the proposed mechanism dominates them in social surplus, seller's revenue, and incentive of buyers for truth-telling. We also analyze the characteristics of the social surplus and the revenue achieved by the proposed mechanism, including the constant approximability of the worst-case efficiency loss and the complexity of optimizing revenue from the seller's perspective.
Published Date: 2020-06-02
Registration: ISSN 2374-3468 (Online) ISSN 2159-5399 (Print) ISBN 978-1-57735-835-0 (10 issue set)
Copyright: Published by AAAI Press, Palo Alto, California USA Copyright © 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence All Rights Reserved