On the Complexity of the Inverse Semivalue Problem for Weighted Voting Games

No. 1: AAAI-19, IAAI-19, EAAI-20

Volume

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 33

AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms

Weighted voting games are a family of cooperative games, typically used to model voting situations where a number of agents (players) vote against or for a proposal. In such games, a proposal is accepted if an appropriately weighted sum of the votes exceeds a prespecified threshold. As the influence of a player over the voting outcome is not in general proportional to her assigned weight, various power indices have been proposed to measure each player’s influence. The inverse power index problem is the problem of designing a weighted voting game that achieves a set of target influences according to a predefined power index. In this work, we study the computational complexity of the inverse problem when the power index belongs to the class of semivalues. We prove that the inverse problem is computationally intractable for a broad family of semivalues, including all regular semivalues. As a special case of our general result, we establish computational hardness of the inverse problem for the Banzhaf indices and the Shapley values, arguably the most popular power indices.

10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011869