@article{Chapman_1989, title={Penguins Can Make Cake}, volume={10}, url={https://ojs.aaai.org/aimagazine/index.php/aimagazine/article/view/965}, DOI={10.1609/aimag.v10i4.965}, abstractNote={This article is a reply to Matthew Ginsberg’s article entitled "Universal Planning: An (Almost) Universally Bad Idea." Ginsberg argues that uni-versal plans are infeasible for reasons of compu-tational complexity and concludes that classical planning -- or something like it -- is the appropri-ate basis for activity. He also argues that a number of other systems, including Pengi, are approximately universal plans and subject to the same criticisms. I think that this extension is incorrect. I illustrate my reasoning with a description of Blockhead, a Pengi-like system that efficiently solves the fruitcake problem which Ginsberg argues is infeasible for universal plans. The structure of Blockhead elucidates the relationship between planning, universal plans, and Pengi. I conclude that planning and universal plans are computationally intractable because of the representational assumptions they make.}, number={4}, journal={AI Magazine}, author={Chapman, David}, year={1989}, month={Dec.}, pages={45} }