Blameworthiness in Strategic Games
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33013011Abstract
There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but the coalition had a strategy to prevent it. The main technical result is a sound and complete bimodal logical system that describes properties of blameworthiness in one-shot games.
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Published
2019-07-17
How to Cite
Naumov, P., & Tao, J. (2019). Blameworthiness in Strategic Games. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 33(01), 3011-3018. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33013011
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Section
AAAI Technical Track: Knowledge Representation and Reasoning