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Tool Auctions

Authors

Janosch Döcker

University of Tübingen


Britta Dorn

University of Tübingen


Ulle Endriss

ILLC, University of Amsterdam


Ronald de Haan

ILLC, University of Amsterdam


Sebastian Schneckenburger

University of Tübingen


Published:

2018-02-08

Proceedings:

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 32

Volume

Issue:

Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2018

Track:

AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms

Downloads:

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Abstract:

We introduce tool auctions, a novel market mechanism for constructing a cost-efficient assembly line for producing a desired set of products from a given set of goods and tools. Such tools can be used to transform one type of good into a different one. We then study the computational complexity of tool auctions in detail, using methods from both classical and parameterized complexity theory. While solving such auctions is intractable in general, just as for the related frameworks of combinatorial and mixed auctions, we are able to identify several special cases of practical interest where designing efficient algorithms is possible.

DOI:

10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11473


AAAI

Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2018


ISSN 2374-3468 (Online) ISSN 2159-5399 (Print)


Published by AAAI Press, Palo Alto, California USA Copyright © 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence All Rights Reserved.