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Home > Proceedings / Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 31 > No. 1: Thirty-First AAAI Conference On Artificial Intelligence

Envy-Free Mechanisms with Minimum Number of Cuts

Authors

Reza Alijani

Duke University


Majid Farhadi

Sharif University of Technology


Mohammad Ghodsi

Sharif University of Technology


Masoud Seddighin

Sharif University of Technology


Ahmad Tajik

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor


Proceedings:

No. 1: Thirty-First AAAI Conference On Artificial Intelligence

Volume

Issue:

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 31

Track:

AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms

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Abstract:

We study the problem of fair division of a heterogeneous resource among strategic players. Given a divisible heterogeneous cake, we wish to divide the cake among n players in a way that meets the following criteria: (I) every player(weakly) prefers his allocated cake to any other playerÕs share (such notion is known as envy-freeness), (II) the mechanism is strategy-proof (truthful), and (III) the number of cuts made on the cake is minimal. We provide methods, namely expansion process and expansion process with unlocking, for dividing the cake under different assumptions on the valuation functions of the players.

DOI:

10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10584


AAAI

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 31