Published:
2018-02-08
Proceedings:
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 32
Volume
Issue:
Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2018
Track:
AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms
Downloads:
Abstract:
In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is sufficiently large.
DOI:
10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11450
AAAI
Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2018
ISSN 2374-3468 (Online) ISSN 2159-5399 (Print)
Published by AAAI Press, Palo Alto, California USA Copyright © 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence All Rights Reserved.