Published:
2020-06-02
Proceedings:
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 34
Volume
Issue:
Vol. 34 No. 02: AAAI-20 Technical Tracks 2
Track:
AAAI Technical Track: Game Theory and Economic Paradigms
Downloads:
Abstract:
Cellular traffic offloading is nowadays an important problem in mobile networking. We model it as a procurement problem where each agent sells multi-units of a homogeneous item with privately known capacity and unit cost, and the auctioneer's demand valuation function is symmetric submodular. Based on the framework of random sampling and profit extraction, we aim to design a prior-free mechanism which guarantees a profit competitive to the omniscient single-price auction. However, the symmetric submodular demand valuation function and 2-parameter setting present new challenges. By adopting the highest feasible clear price, we successfully design a truthful profit extractor, and then we propose a mechanism which is proved to be truthful, individually rational and constant-factor competitive in a fixed market.
DOI:
10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5607
AAAI
Vol. 34 No. 02: AAAI-20 Technical Tracks 2
ISSN 2374-3468 (Online) ISSN 2159-5399 (Print) ISBN 978-1-57735-835-0 (10 issue set)
Published by AAAI Press, Palo Alto, California USA Copyright © 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence All Rights Reserved