Borda Count in Collective Decision Making: A Summary of Recent Results

No. 1: AAAI-19, IAAI-19, EAAI-20

Volume

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 33

Senior Member Presentation Track: Summary Talks

Borda Count is one of the earliest and most important voting rules. Going far beyond voting, we summarize recent advances related to Borda in computational social choice and, more generally, in collective decision making. We first present a variety of well known attacks modeling strategic behavior in voting—including manipulation, control, and bribery—and discuss how resistant Borda is to them in terms of computational complexity. We then describe how Borda can be used to maximize social welfare when indivisible goods are to be allocated to agents with ordinal preferences. Finally, we illustrate the use of Borda in forming coalitions of players in a certain type of hedonic game. All these approaches are central to applications in artificial intelligence.

10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019830