Representing von Neumann-Morgenstern Games in the Situation Calculus

Oliver Schulte and James Delgrande

Sequential von Neumarm-Morgernstern (VM) games are very general formalism for representing multi-agent interac-tions and planning problems in a variety of types of environ-ments. We show that sequential VM games with countably many actions and continuous utility functions have a sound and complete axiomatization in the situation calculus. We discuss the application of various concepts from VM game theory to the theory of planning and multi-agent interactions, such as representing concurrent actions and using the Baire topology to define continuous payoff functions. Keywords: decision and game theory, multiagent systems, knowledge representation, reasoning about actions and change


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