Mehdi Dastani and Leendert van der Torre
Strategic games model the interaction between simultaneous decisions of a group of agents. The starting point of strate-gic games is a set of players (agents) having certain strategies (decisions) and preferences on the game’s outcomes. In this paper we do not assume the set of decisions and preferences of agents to be given, but derive them from their mental at-titudes. In particular, we introduce a rule-based architecture for agents with beliefs and desires and explain how their de-cisions and preferences can be derived. We specify groups of such agents, define a mapping from their specification to the specification of the game they play, and use some familiar notions from game theory, such as Pareto efficiency and Nash equilibrium, to characterize the interaction between their de-cisions. We also discuss a reverse mapping from the specifi-cation of games that a group of agent play to the specifications of those agents. This mapping can be used to specify groups of agents that can play a ceratin game.