Using Iterated Best-Response to Find Bayes-Nash Equilibrium in Auctions

Victor Naroditskiy, Amy Greenwald

Bayes-Nash equilibria (BNE) have been derived analytically only for the simplest auction settings. Such settings include single-item first- and second-price auctions with continuous distributions of bidders' values. Very little research has been devoted to auctions with discrete bids and values. We take some important first steps in this direction by computationally investigating when an iterated best-response procedure might lead to a BNE.

Subjects: 1.8 Game Playing; 7.1 Multi-Agent Systems

Submitted: Apr 11, 2007


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