Power, Dependence and Stability in Multiagent Plans

Sviatoslav Brainov and Tuomas Sandholm, Washington University

In this paper we present a decision-theoretic model of social power and social dependence that accounts for origins of different choices available in different situations. According to the model almost every group activity, whether it is cooperation or exploitation, has its origins in resolving some dependence or power relation. The model is intended for self-interested agents and explains power and dependence in terms of relations between agents’ plans. It is a generalization of the dependence network model and accounts for situations of group dependence, i.e., situations in which an agent depends on a group or a group depends on an agent. The model is applied to the analysis of stability of multiagent plans. Stable dependence structures of multiagent plans are identified. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of joint plans are provided.

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